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Introduction
The modern literature of corporate structure has stressed the agency problem where ownership is dispersed and shareholders have a passive role. Executive directors have a strong independence and cross incentives through bonus shares payments. This implies that they have incentives to disclose information when a company's investments succeeded but they also hide information when there are significant losses. This figure usually applies to big American corporations and British publicly traded firms where legislation forbids individual stakes greater than 25%.
Studies published during the last five years had questioning the typical Bearle and Means (1932) corporation, providing evidence that ownership structures outside the AngloSaxon world are complex due to the existence of cross-shareholdings, webs, pyramids, rings, and other many types of structures and holdings' webs. The most representative studies on the issue of measuring corporate ownership and control beyond the US case since the mid 1990s
are perhaps Laporta et al (1999) , Claessenss et al (2000) , and Barca and Bech (2001) . The first study covers the 20 largest publicly traded firms in each of the 21 OECD economies, along with six non-OECD countries 2 . Their main finding was that the largest shareholders and ultimate owners leverage their corporate control through pyramids and other hierarchical business group structures.
The second study assembled data on 2,980 East Asian corporations. This study is by far the most comprehensive regarding the measurement of cash flow to voting rights ratios. The main finding is that voting rights exceed cash flow rights due to pyramid structures and cross holdings. The third is composed by nine case studies of corporate ownership within continental Europe. It includes cases in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain. The common finding across those studies is that ownership and control are highly concentrated and differs in large scale from the UK and US patterns. In fact, as more results became available from new country studies, they tend to confirm that widely held corporate structures are outlier structures and are found mainly in the UK and the US.
Such pattern should not differ within Latin American publicly traded corporations. The largest 2 They are: Argentina, Israel, Hong Kong, South Korea, Mexico, and Singapore.
listed corporations are central pieces of complex business group structures that form several webs, through property chains between corporations and unlisted firms, financial and nonfinancial firms, core and non-core businesses, and in general different types of pure cross shareholdings.
Business groups in Colombia also respond to complex structures. They are centered around a core business with strategic alliances in non-core activities along with holding's investment and fiduciary funds that play a central role as ultimate controllers as well as key players in forming coalitions to control boards. This paper provides for the first time evidence in measuring ownership and control for Colombian corporations following the methodologies used in the studies of La Porta (1999) and their successors, becoming the first comprehensive case study for one of the main emerging markets in Latin America where there is not much published work on the topic. Besides this introduction the paper has seven additional sections.
Section 2 reviews the studies on corporate control and governance in Latin America and Colombia. Section 3 explains the used dataset as well as the followed methodology to measure integrated ownership as proxy of investor's voting rights. Section 4 shows the ownership statistics for an average sample of 141 real sector listed firms during the 1996-2002 period that were overseen by the Superintendence of Securities. Section 5 presents the ownership structure analysis of the three largest and oldest business groups in the country. Section 6 displays the core results regarding the separation of corporate ownership and control. Section 7 complements the previous exercise by studying the composition of the ultimate controllers and its variation across periods. Section 8 concludes.
Corporate Ownership and Governance Studies in Latin America and Colombia
The subject of Corporate Governance (CG) has generated many case country studies for developed economies. In contrast, research for developing economies is limited and new. By mid-2003 there were few published papers on the topic for the case of Latin America. We can highlight the work of Agosin and Pastén (2003) who present a description of CG in Chile during the 90s. They analyze CG as an insider system where business groups control publicly traded companies. Taking a sample of 177 listed companies, they found i) a high degree of corporate concentration, a problem that is evident in all economic sectors, and ii) the debt/equity ratios are low when compared to those of Korea, The last result is puzzling since insider systems make use of debt instead of equity to finance their projects to protect their ownership and control structures. The explanation is due to the apparent underdevelopment of Apreda (2000) reviews CG in Argentina before 1990 and provides an account of the legal frame adopted in the 90s to implement good governance principles in corporate companies. As in the Chilean case, it is clear that the development of CG was induced by the privatization of SOEs and firm mergers. These events framed the evolution of CG in
Argentina moving from family-owned companies to corporate companies driven by foreign and institutional investors, which have contributed to streamlining the governance system as in common law countries. Claessens, Klingebiel, & Lubrano (2000) study the Brazilian case. These authors found also poor governance in Brazilian corporations despite the existence of a Code of Best Practice issued by the Brazilian Institute of CG. One reason is the prevalence of non-voting shares in corporations, and the lack of good measures to protect minority investor rights. All in all stock concentration remains very high in Brazil. Neto (2000) provides an analysis of the legal aspects of CG in Brazil regarding specific topics. The paper follows a questions-answers format about developments on domestic CG issues. Saito (2000) reviews the CG legislation in Brazil focusing on the legal determinants of share composition with voting and non-voting powers, and the degree of protection provided to outside investors. The paper tests three hypotheses. The first one tries to see how the ratio of non-voting equity to total equity correlates with the voting premium, the second test how the price differential between voting and non-voting stocks behaves with leverage, and the third one tries to see the impact of the 1997 corporate law on ordinary and preferred marginal shareholders.
Last, Chong et al. (2003) The same happened with a recent study about the evolution and behavior of capital markets in Colombia during the nineties [Arbeláez, Zuluaga, & Guerra (2002) ], where the subject and importance of CG were limited to a single footnote, ignoring the agency theory and empirical evidence that the literature on financial economics has been stressing during the last 20 years. However, the study did mention some concerns about regulatory and institutional development, but the authors do not seem to give too much weight to them. In fact, they focus their short and implicit analysis of governance on bank versus market-based modes given their diagnostic about the development of capital markets in Colombia. But as La Porta et al (2000a, 18) 
Data and Methodology
The data of corporate shareholders used in this study comes from two sources: i) In order to complete a company's second and in some cases a third property layer, we assembled a dataset of major shareholders' information of unlisted firms that showed up as a major shareholder of a listed corporation and affiliated within a business group. This information comes from the Superintendence for Commercial Societies. The
Superintendence, according to Law 222 of 1995, and the subsequent Decree 3100 of 1997, mandates that commercial companies with total assets or total earnings equal or over twenty thousand legal monthly minimum wages (US$ 2.9 million) at the end of a given fiscal year are subject to the inspection and surveillance of the Superintendence. Further, it oversees all commercial companies whose owners are, in turn, companies subject to oversight and who own at least 20% of the commercial company. In this way, the Superintendence can follow-up all matrix, branch and subsidiary company. Decree 3100 also empowered it to oversee the subsidiaries of all foreign companies. confidential and not publicly available 11 . In sum, we assembled three layers of ownership.
The Applications are traced back to the work of Brioschi, Buzzachi, and Colombo (1989) and Ellerman (1991) who used an input-output theory to arrange the ownership structure of firms and derive a measure of integrated ownership. Flath (1992) The starting point in the methodology is the definition of a ( )
where ij a is the observed share of stocks of firm i in firm j . Three properties of the elements of A in order to be used under input-output hypothesis are:
Where 1, , 1, ,
This model determines the integrated (direct + indirect) ownership on the basis that all firms are affiliated within a business group. We followed the definition of integrated ownership as the total value of equities recruited by a firm, which is unknown, but stems from its direct and indirect ownership on other firms of the business group.
12 The first step in implementing this definition is the solution for the integrated ownership matrix Y = [ ij y ]:
where the first term in the right side of equation (4) represents the direct equity held by firm i in firm j − ij a , and the second one represents the indirect equity that firm i holds into firm j.
The solution for Y and its presentation in matrix notation is:
Equation (5) (6) is 13 :
Thus, we used the formula in (7) to estimate integrated ownership for all affiliated firms in our sample and followed such an approach because Colombian corporate data resembles the European group structures with high concentration in direct ownership and voting levels. Lastly, we computed the firm's direct ownership through concentration ratios [Becht, (1997) 
Ownership Statistics
A well known fact in Colombia is that corporate ownership and control is highly concentrated. This fact has been tied to the formation of conglomerates and business groups from the 1950s to late 1970s where vertical control was the incentive to control productive chains from upstream to downstream industries. Most of them started as family businesses and then became corporate groups with strategic investments in their core business. In fact, business groups in Colombia are specialized and differentiated entities in which the holding 14 There is a common critique for both methodologies in the way of counting the voting rights, since might be double counting in cross share holdings, and thus integrate ownership statistics might overestimate the concentration of voting rights when the ultimate owner can not be traced fully such as a holding. An interesting refinement of this methodology is in system where there are not deviations from one share one vote rule. Applying the simple majority rule a shareholder with direct shares above 50% will exert company's total control. For details, see Becht (1997) and Chapelle (2004 This paper does not address those issues, which are analyzed and econometrically tested in Gutierrez, Pombo and Taborda (2005b) . Simply we ask if the distribution of ownership concentration has recently changed, and by this means we provide new evidence on the structure and patterns of equity concentration. The above numbers suggest that effectively there was a change in the distribution of ownership concentration at firm's first stake layer. This increases by turn, the direct voting rights of the largest stockholders. Firm's absolute control is upheld within a firm's largest four stakes. For the largest stockholder, Colombia is below around 20% that the average observed in six out of the seven European countries in Becht's study. Numbers start catching up at CR3 or CR4 levels. For the largest top-four stockholders the average sum of the direct stakes is 66%
while Colombia is 65%. Thus, Colombia's data resembles the European case and so must the structures of the larger business groups. This numbers are very different for USA and the UK.
The largest block holder in the UK has around 15% while for the sample of listed corporations 16 One point needs further explanation regarding the health care companies in our sample. The health system in Colombia has two types of private health care provides. One is the so called Heath Promoting Companies, which belong to the mandatory health program. Their prices are regulated and received cross subsidies from the social security system. Their main source of income is the social security deductibles from all people with formal labor contract in the country. The other is the pre-paid medicine companies similar to the HMCO in the US which work through direct contracts. Those contracts are not price regulated. The main regulation that these companies face is quality service regulation that is similar to any industry that has to comply with safe product regulation. The companies in our sample are pre-paid medicine companies and private clinics. at the NYSE the figure is around 8.5%. The next section analyzes the structure of the three largest, most traditional and important real sector business groups in the country.
Examples of Ownership Structures
Business group structures in Colombia are complex. There is no restriction for cross- The three larger and best known non-financial business groups in Colombia are the socalled Sindicato Antioqueño, the Santodomingo group and the Ardila group. These three holdings count for 59 out of 116 affiliated corporations of our sample, and represent more than 50% of sales or fixed assets for the entire sample of 233 firms (affiliated plus nonaffiliated firms). Description follows.
Sindicato Antoqueño
The Sindicato Antioqueño refers to a business group formed by firms in several industries as well as financial companies. Its core businesses are cement, processed food, roasted coffee, iron, tobacco, construction, textiles, investment funds, trust funds, investment banks (corporaciones financieras) and insurance firms. The number of companies affiliated to the group is around 100 between listed and non-listed firms. Its structure is the result of several alliances and web of firms that make it a pure cross share holding. Its name comes from the province in which its key companies are based, around the city of Medellin, which has the second largest industrial district in Colombia and the largest textile and apparel industries within the Andean countries. Some of the companies have more that 80 years of being Argos has direct investments across the largest cement companies in the country and integrates all the productive chain: stone quarrying, clay, and sand mining, manufacture of cement, cement mixing, reinforced concrete, and distribution. Argos's group has one-half of market share and exports around 2.5 million tons per year. 
Inversiones Reacol (5.7%) and Nacional de Chocolates (3.7%). These numbers suggest that
Argos is one of the few cases in Colombia of a widely held company in the 20 percent sense. 
Santo Domingo Group
The Santo Domingo group is the second largest business group in the country. Its core business started within the beer industry. Bavaria S.A has been the leading beer company and brand in the country and is one of the 10 largest firms in Colombia by size of sales and assets.
It is also one of the largest beer companies in Latin America. 
Ardila-Group
The Ardila group is the third main conglomerate and dominates the soft-drink industry. The group has vertical control in the production of key inputs. On one side, it has direct investments in three large sugar refining mills. The holding funds together own 53% of
Ingenio del Cauca, which owns 45% of Ingenio Providencia which in turn owns 9% of
Ingenio Risaralda, where Ingenio del Cauca has a 20% stake. Providencia is the second main shareholder of Sucromiles, a company that manufactures citric acid. On the other side, the holding funds control the manufacturer of bottle lids [Tapas la Libertad] with a stake of 89%.
The group also has control over its distribution network. The truck fleet is gathered in Empresa de Distribución Industriales S.A which is controlled by Servisa and Besmit S.A with 88% stake. This is another holding company with direct and representative investments across the group beverage firms. To square the circle, the group has stakes in PELDAR S.A, the glass manufacturer, in which there is a representative foreign investment share 21 .
The group has large investments in several non-core businesses. The most representative are textiles and the media and communication industries. The Ardila group took control over with an aggregate stake of 80%. Regarding the media companies these are RCN radio and RCN TV, where the holding investment funds Gamesa and Servinsa are the ultimate controllers. Both funds have a 53% stake in RCN Radio, which in turn owns 38% of RCN TV and along with the 14% stake of Gamesa investment they exert absolute control over that firm.
Summarizing, the above analysis of the largest business groups in Colombia showed the existence of a mixture of ownership structures, high rates of direct stakes concentration, and full specialization in each group core business. There are no intra-group investments. If there is some, it is as a minority stockholder such as the case of Coltejer where some companies affiliated to the Sindicato have around 10% stake in the company. In addition, entrepreneurial history in Colombia has shown no successful undertakings when one conglomerate seeks entry and competes for a rival's core-markets. Perhaps the most representative and recent example was when the Ardila group built a new brewery in 1994.
Six years later the company was acquired by Bavaria, because of its cash flow deficits and low plant low capacity utilization rate.
The separation of ownership and control
The agency theory suggested for Berle and Means (1932) and control is given by the direct to integrated ownership ratio and must be less than one by construction. Third, concentration of voting is greater in manufacturing, and health and personal services companies but with opposite trends. In manufacturing the median of the voting concentration rises by ten points passing from 0.36 to 0.46, while in health companies the median decreases from 0.53 to 0.50. Regarding the financial and insurance companies, they are composed by holding investment or trust funds and play a role as ultimate controllers within the business groups. The voting concentration has remained constant, so these ultimate owners are still strategically the same. Fifth, separation ratios are high and above 0.9 in most cases. This reflects that firm control is exerted through direct ownership. Thus, corporate structure follows a strong owner management bias. In other words, owners command, control boards and appoint CEOs.
The overall ratios tend to be slightly higher in Colombia (0.94, 0.96) than those found in other studies. For instance Chapelle (2001) reports a 0.80 separation ratio for the large voting block for 135 listed Belgium firms in 1995. report an overall ultimate A. Cash Flow Rights (Direct Ownership) controller separation ratio average of 0.74 for 2,611 publicly traded East Asian corporations for 1997. Among them Hong Kong reports a ratio of 0.88, Philipines of 0.90, and Thailand of 0.94. In addition, La Porta et al. (1999) find that for the cases of Argentina and Mexico ultimate controllers need around 19.6% and 16.5% of cash flow to get 20% voting rights. It is important to point out that deviations from the one-share-one-vote rule are low, meaning separation ratios close to one, in two opposite cases. The first is associated with widely held corporations with lower voting power for the largest stockholders such as the case of the top 20 corporations in the US as presented in La Porta et. al (1999) . The second case arises in highly concentrated ownership structures where the largest voting block has companies' absolute control with overall direct votes greater than 50%. This case will induce a strong control bias toward owners. Thus, there is no need of further voting leverage through indirect ownership investments.
Despite the above, the separation ratios for Colombian corporations decrease around 15 percentage points if one computes that measure relative to the top-four largest stockholders according to the findings reported in Table 7 . The mean (median) of the separation ratio for the total sample decreases to a 0.75 (0.82) level. Here it is clear that there is voting leverage through investments in pyramidal or cross shareholding structures. In addition, the separation ratio measures for the largest and ultimate controller within the Sindicato Antioqueño group is lower than the total sample. The mean (median) was 0.85 (0.87) for the 1996-1999 period, and slightly arose to 0.89 (0.89) after 2000. Hence, the presence of cross ownership across firms increases total voting leverages of ultimate owners.
Toward a coalition hypothesis of corporate control?
The separation ratio measures suggest that there is an owner-control bias in contrast to the strong management and passive investor role observed in US corporations. To illustrate the control direction bias we used the cumulative distribution functions (c.d.f) for the largest direct voting block and the top-two direct voting blocks as used in the studies collected by Barca and Becht (2001) . The intuition behind these graphs is to find how asymmetric a cumulative distribution function is. Concentration ratios by definition are within the zero-one interval. Thus, the maximum value for an ownership stake is 100% of a company's net worth. Renneboog (2001) and Becht (2001) show that such distributions follow an inverse-L shape for the United Kingdom and United States cases. In particular their findings show that at a 50% fraction of data, direct ownership stakes are less than 10% in the UK, and less than 5% in the US. The opposite case is Germany, where the c.d.f of the largest direct voting block lies above the 45% line. At the 50% fraction of data direct ownership is around 60%, meaning an absolute control of the largest shareholder across German companies under the one share one vote regime.
The picture changes drastically if one plots the c.d.f for the top-two largest voting blocks. Figure 9 summarizes the results where the c.d.f is above the 45% degree line. Thus, there is absolute control if the two largest shareholders collude in order to take over companies' board and management. In affiliated companies usually the two largest shareholders belong to the holding. However, this might not the case for the non-affiliated ones or for holdings with substantial cross shares where the second and third largest voting blocks play an important strategic role in keeping the group control across the holding's firms.
Next section explores what is the composition of ultimate owners.
Ultimate shareholders
A central question regarding corporate ownership is who the ultimate shareholders are. If a firm has an ultimate controller means that she has enough voting rights to exert a firm's control. Concentration of voting rights is crucial for the designing of a firm's management, The first finding concerns to ultimate shareholders composition. Family controlled firms have low weight within the study sample for both years. They represent at most 6.5% (1996) within the total sample and they reduce to 3.3% (2002) Hence, the Santo Domingo family is the ultimate owner of the 17 listed firms included in our study sample as well as around 100 unlisted companies and commercial societies. The second finding is that widely held firms represent around 28% of ultimate shareholders in 1996 despite ownership concentration within corporations. Here, the same caveat for investment firms applies. In several cases these widely held partnerships were unlisted firms, investment and trust funds showed up as ultimate controllers. These cases is common to suspect that if you have 10 family members or relatives with uniform shares none of them will have more than 10% voting rights and show up statistically as a widely held firm.
Around 40% of the widely held firms matched with investment firms, individual fiduciary contracts and unlisted firms where families are the final owners. The remainder 60% were truly widely held firms in the sense that the sum of minority shareholders had the largest stake in those companies. Widely held firms decreased their participation to 10% by 2002.
The third result is that financial institutions play a limited role as controlling shareholders in contrast the truly equity power of families as mentioned, and the significant of ownership domestic corporations. Banks are forbidden by regulation to have direct stakes in real sector companies. However, they make presence through subsidiary firms such as trust funds, investment banks, and insurance companies. For both years financial institutions are less than 10% of the controlling owners. This finding is consistent with those numbers reported in La Porta (199) and Classensen (2000) studies. Domestic corporations are the second source for controlling shareholders, representing around 25% for both years, and foreign firms increased their participation as ultimate owners from 1996 to 2002. This is 22 Information regarding individual shareholders and names of investment funds is recorded in some cases at the Superintendence of Societies data base, which as mentioned is confidential for third parties. In addition, is common to find investment firms that are not registered at any Colombia's chambers of Commerce and located in Panama City, Caiman Islands and other fiscal paradises which impede the tracing of further shareholders. The fourth result regards with the voting power of controlling shareholders. On average ultimate owners had 37% voting rights for the total sample and 31% for affiliated firms in 23 The miscellaneous category reported in ultimate controlling shareholders' tables includes private foundations, cooperatives, universities, live stock funds among other legal forms of commercial societies.
1996. These numbers increased to 42% and 38% in 2002. Ultimate owners have more separation of cash flow to control voting within holding firms. On average the separation ratio is 94% for the total sample and 89% for holding firms where there exists more voting leverage through pyramids and cross share holdings. Investment and domestic corporations show lower separation ratios for both years within affiliated firms meaning that they have more ownership relations and links within business groups. One detail is that the average voting power of widely held firms might exceed the 20% cutoff. This is because for some companies the blocks of minority shareholders add up in some cases to 80%, and there is no information of how many individuals form those voting blocks in order to figure out minorities' average voting rights. Another finding is that separation ratios have a minimum value of zero in both years for several cases such as investment, limited liability and domestic corporations. This means that in some companies there are controlling shareholders with zero cash flow and have the greatest voting rights. This is a strong outcome that reinforces the previous results, and constitutes an evidence of the real voting power leverage that takes place within business group companies.
Conclusions
This paper has conduced a deep analysis about the separation of ownership and control for real sector listed companies that were security issuers and therefore listed corporations during the 1996-2002 period in Colombia. The study provides for first time evidence for this economy of direct measures of voting rights at the ultimate shareholder level following the modern approach of recent studies of corporate ownership and control done for East Asia, and European countries. It also constitute the first comprehensive case study for a Latin American country where measures of voting rights are restricted to few cases with limited property layers with out covering the entire business group structures.
Our findings suggest that direct ownership and direct voting blocks of the largest shareholder has on average 35% of a company's equity. This number is 20% below the average in continental Europe. The stake of the top-four largest shareholders is about 65% matching the power level of largest blocks observed in countries such as Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Spain according to the numbers reported in Becht's study of control in Corporate Europe. We also found that ownership concentration has risen about 5% from 1996 to 2002 but none single voting block has the 51% absolute direct control under one share-one-vote regime. In particular, the top four shareholders increased their direct control form 60% to 65% from 1996 to 2002 and the fraction of firms increased from 20% to 30% where the top-four voting blocks have between 90% to 100% a company's stake. Equity concentration of the largest block is larger within non-affiliated firms than the ones affiliated to business groups. In this case the largest stake is around 45% of company's total equity. Here it seems that stock holders prefer to have direct and absolute control.
Voting leverage is implemented within affiliated firms to business groups. The separation ratio of cash flow to voting rights is on average 0.94, similar to the levels observed in emerging markets with high equity concentration such as Thailand. The separation increases if one restricts such measurement to affiliated firms, the top-four share holders or at controlling shareholders within business groups. In particular, we found that the separation ratio for the top-four block holders was around 0.77 for the 1996-1999 period, and it The analysis of controlling shareholders shows that around three-fourths of the firms have ultimate controllers. Families are the most important source of equity power. We decomposed ultimate owners in ten types of legal societies. We found that investment firms, fiduciary fund contracts, and unlisted firms such as limited liability or non-traded corporations, families are behind those property layers and in fact they are the ultimate owners. Equity control by financial institutions is less common and this finding is consistent with what has been found in other developed and emerging capital markets. On the other hand, corporate control is privately biased in contrast the strong and independent management bias typically found within American corporations. Here, owners set firm control and policies.
Concentration of cash flow rights and voting leverage constitute a natural barrier for deepen corporate structures, develop capital markets, incentive firms to adopt codes of best practices and the further develop of institutional channels for good corporate governance ruling. A
